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ARTICLES
CIVIL FORFEITURE: A HIGHER FORM OF
COMMERCIAL LAW?
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ AND ALAN E. ROTHMAN*
In this Article, Messrs. Schwarcz and Rothman analyze the disquieting
impact of civil forfeiture law on creditors' rights. The Article begins by
describing the historical origins of civil forfeiture and its development
into current day law. The Article then explores the tension between for-
feiture law and commercial and bankruptcy law by examining the effect
of a forfeiture action on unsecured and undersecured creditors. The
Article evaluates a recent model for balancing governmental and com-
mercial law interests, and concludes by suggesting reforms to the present
civil forfeiture scheme.
INTRODUCTION
We continue to be enormously troubled by the government's increas-
ing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the
disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes.'
N May 1992, the federal government commenced the third largest fed-
eral civil forfeiture action in United States history3 against more than
$400 million of the assets of John McNamara, a powerful New York real
estate holder, car dealer, philanthropist, and leading Republican Party
* © Copyright 1993 by Steven L. Schwarcz and Alan E. Rothman. Mr. Schwarcz
is a partner and practice group chairman in the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
& Handler and also teaches courses in commercial and bankruptcy law at Yale, Colum-
bia, and Cardozo (Yeshiva University) law schools. Mr. Rothman is a 1993 graduate of
Columbia Law School and presently is studying advanced Talmudic law at Yeshiva Uni-
versity before joining Mr. Schwarcz's law firm. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
research assistance of Paul S. Feira, Robert Grass, Stephan W. Milo, and Eric M.
O'Meara in the preparation of this Article, and also express appreciation to Paul J. Cur-
ran, Herbert S. Edelman, Egon Guttman, and Martin S. Saman for their helpful com-
ments on drafts of this Article. The authors particularly wish to thank David Gray
Carlson, Gerard E. Lynch, and Paul M. Shupack for their extremely helpful comments
and suggestions.
1. United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d
Cir. 1992).
2. The term "forfeiture" has been defined in the legal context as "[l]oss of some right
or property as a penalty for some illegal act." Black's Law Dictionary 650 (6th ed. 1990).
Under the existing federal statutory scheme, forfeitures may arise as a criminal action,
such as under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), see 18
U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), or as a civil action, see 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Criminal forfeitures are in
personam actions (actions against a named criminal defendant), where the forfeiture is an
automatic consequence of the defendant's conviction. See United States v. Angiulo, 897
F.2d 1169, 1210 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990). Civil forfeitures, by contrast
under the federal statutes, are in rem actions (actions against the property to be forfeited).
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contributor. This forfeiture proceeding,4 initiated pursuant to the civil
forfeiture provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,1 has had an
enormous impact not only on McNamara but also on innocent unsecured
and undersecured 6 creditors, including major financial and banking insti-
tutions. The McNamara case is but one example in an alarming trend in
which the federal government's application of civil forfeiture laws,
although serving some beneficial purposes,7 is creating a regime of com-
mercial uncertainty and confusion.
With forfeitures of this scale, the broad reach of the civil forfeiture
statutes comes into direct conflict with the rights of innocent third par-
ties who engage in legitimate commercial dealings with the alleged
wrongdoer, or with companies or assets traceable to the wrongdoer.
Ironically, forfeiture of commercial assets is an inadvertent attack on pri-
vate property rights perpetrated by the very governmental officials who
are sworn to protect and defend those rights. The underlying issue is
how to balance the commercially reasonable expectations of third parties
with the legitimate forfeiture interests of the government.
The dollar value of assets subject to federal forfeiture actions has risen
See James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 Cornell
L. Rev. 768, 768 (1977).
Civil forfeiture will be the primary focus of this Article, not only because of its increas-
ingly frequent use by the government, but also because it targets the "guilty property"
without regard to the culpability of the property's owners. This does not mean that crim-
inal forfeiture actions do not share potential for some of the criticisms of civil forfeiture
raised in this Article, but the fact that property is forfeited only as a consequence of a
criminal conviction provides for certain meaningful checks on abuse of due process and
general lack of formal procedures.
3. See Thomas J. Lueck, Port Jefferson Auto Dealer Forfeits Most of His Assets, N.Y.
Times, May 20, 1992, at B1, B5. The only larger civil forfeiture actions were Michael
Milken's forfeiture of $900 million to the SEC and BCCI's forfeiture of $500 million to
U.S. depositors and investors. See id.
4. See United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July
16, 1992). The authors represent a major creditor in the McNamara proceeding,
although the views expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors.
5. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-35 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 981).
6. See infra note 193. References in this Article to unsecured claims will include the
unsecured portions of undersecured claims.
7. Civil forfeiture, if narrowly targeted at a wrongdoer, can serve many salutary
purposes. For example, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York, under the guidance of the United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani, aggres-
sively utilized civil forfeiture to seize public housing dwellings of narcotic dealers, thus
creating a safer living environment for low-income housing dwellers. See Harry
Berkowitz & May Voboril, Campaign Trailers: Giuliani Ad Watch, Newsday, Aug. 15,
1993, at 41.
As this Article will show, some government prosecutors are abusing civil forfeiture by
applying civil forfeiture statutes to certain classes of non-culpable third parties. The pres-
ent forfeiture system's gravest flaw is the seizure of property now in the hands of innocent
third parties coupled with the lack of an effective process where these individuals' claims
can be meaningfully heard and adjudicated. Because the application of civil forfeiture
statutes is supplanting traditional methods of claim resolution in broad sweeping forfei-
ture actions, prosecutors should pause to reflect upon the impact this application has on
commercial law and activity.
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dramatically in recent years. As of September 30, 1990, the Department
of Justice ("DOJ"), the agency responsible for executing civil forfeiture
actions, had a $478 million balance in its Assets Forfeiture Fund.' By
1993, the value of forfeited assets in the DOJ inventory had grown to
$1.8 billion, including 31,698 pieces of property, real and personal.9 This
increased use of forfeiture by the DOJ has led some observers to question
whether "we are seeing fair and effective law enforcement or an insatiable
appetite for a source for increased agency revenue."'"
As the assets confiscated in forfeiture actions continue to grow, so too
grow the concerns of the financial community as to the impact these
drastic measures have on innocent third party creditors. This Article
examines the expansion of forfeiture law into areas previously governed
by traditional forms of commercial and bankruptcy law and the conflicts
created thereby. The Article also examines two important policy ques-
tions" raised by these conflicts. First, should forfeiture law permit the
government to ignore commercial and bankruptcy laws that have devel-
oped over centuries? Second, if forfeiture law is to be applied in a com-
mercial context, how should the rights of innocent third parties be
protected? In order properly to address these questions, however, it is
first necessary to understand the origins and traditional uses of forfeiture
law.
I. ORIGINS AND USES OF FORFEITURE LAW
This Part describes the historical origins of civil forfeiture, its statutory
and case law development, and the fundamental elements of current day
forfeiture law.
A. Historical Origins
Perhaps the most oft-cited source of forfeiture is the Biblical passage:
"if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die, the ox shall be surely
8. See U.S. Dep't of Just., 1990 Ann. Rep. of the Dep't of Just. Asset Forfeiture
Program, App. A at 39.
9. See Steven L. Kessler, Tide is Turning in Federal Forfeiture Rulings, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 5, 1993, at 1, 8 n.l.
10. United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801, 807 n.6 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J.,
dissenting).
11. When forfeiture laws were applied in the past-to seizures of specific assets used
in crimes-the limited scope of these seizures was unlikely to raise significant policy is-
sues in the commercial arena. The seizure of an asset directly used in criminal activity,
such as an automobile used by a drug dealer, probably will not affect an innocent com-
mercial party unless that party has a security interest in the automobile. And, as will be
shown, forfeiture law generally respects the rights of secured parties.
As the McNamara case illustrates, however, when the government uses forfeiture law
to seize not only property used in criminal activity, but all of the assets of a company or
affiliated group of companies owned or controlled by a wrongdoer, the government's
claims can come into direct conflict with the rights of innocent parties who have commer-
cial dealings with these companies.
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten."12 According to the Talmud's
interpretation of this passage, the use of the phrase "and its flesh shall
not be eaten" is intended as a prohibition against receiving benefit from
the animal. This prohibition becomes effective from the moment the of-
fending animal is convicted, even prior to its stoning.13 Thus, the Bibli-
cal source for the notion of forfeiture does not contemplate a scheme
under which a governing body or agency benefits from the use of guilty
property.
Civil forfeiture also traces its roots to the historical notion of "deo-
dand."' 4 "Deodand" is derived from the Latin phrase "Deo Dandum,"
meaning "to be given to God." 5 More precisely, deodand itself
originated in pre-Judeo Christian practices.1 6 These practices, similar to
the Talmud's understanding of the "goring ox" passage, reflect the view
that the instrument of death is accused and that religious atonement is
required. A more expansive view, prevalent in medieval England, per-
ceived the deodand in the "double perspective of a 'religious expiation'
and as a forfeiture or amercement similar in function to exactions by the
Crown in various contexts and activities with the aim of increasing its
revenues."17 Although deodand was initially confined to "guilty prop-
erty," the English kings later expanded deodand to include all property
and chattels belonging to criminals, serving, in principle, as a type of
"fine." 18
Thus, as the English concept of "deodand" developed, it strayed from
Biblical "forfeiture" in two important respects. First, English deodand
theory contemplated that some benefit was to be derived from the guilty
property rather than prohibiting "its flesh [from] be[ing] eaten."' 9 For
example, under English common law, persons convicted of treason for-
feited all their property to the Crown, while convicted felons forfeited
chattels to the Crown and escheated their real property to the lord.2"
Second, unlike its Biblical counterpart, the property subject to forfeiture
12. Exodus 21:28. This passage is cited by virtually all sources on forfeiture. See,
e.g., George C. Pratt & William B. Petersen, Civil Forfeiture in the Second Circuit, 65 St.
John's L. Rev. 653, 654 (1991) (tracing the origins of forfeiture and analyzing its contin-
ued vitality); Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deo-
dands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 Temp. L.Q.
169 (1973) (analyzing the history of sovereignty and forfeiture).
13. See Talmud, Tractate Baba Kamma 41a.
14. See Finkelstein, supra note 12, at 169.
15. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974).
16. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1-38 (1881).
17. Finkelstein, supra note 12, at 183.
18. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81.
19. Exodus 21:28.
20. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. The forfeiture was enforced by the Court of
the Exchequer in an in rem proceeding. This forfeiture to the Crown was premised upon
the notion that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's peace. See id.
(citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *299). This aspect of forfeiture, more correctly
known as attainder, also represented a British expansion of the forfeiture contemplated
by the Bible. Under Biblical law, only those guilty of offenses against the King were
[Vol. 62
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under English law was not limited to the felonious "instrument," but
could include nearly all of the criminal's assets.2 '
In America, civil forfeiture was until recently infrequently used. For-
feitures were largely disfavored, primarily because the government's
seizure of private property was a leading source of tension between the
former colonists and the British Crown.' In fact, the United States Con-
stitution protects property not only through the Due Process Clause,'
but also through a specific limitation on the scope of forfeiture in the
treason context.24
Forfeiture, however, did find limited use in early America, particularly
in admiralty law.25 The First Congress, for example, adopted several
pieces of maritime forfeiture legislation,26 which generally provided for
the forfeiture of ships and cargo for evasion of customs duties and illegal
slave trade.27 The Supreme Court repeatedly upheld the use of forfeiture
in this context.2 8
During the Civil War, forfeiture saw extensive use, initially in the con-
fiscation of rebels' property, and later in the confiscation of property of
Southern sympathizers. 29 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld for-
feiture under a broad construction of the government's military power.30
Thus, American law's expansion of forfeiture beyond the concept of
"guilty property" ironically parallels the English law expansion of forfei-
ture that was disdained by the American colonists. American courts,
therefore, did not rely on deodand as a premise for using forfeiture, but
subject to a forfeiture to the Crown. The property of other convicted or condemned
felons reverted to their heirs. See Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 48b.
21. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680. In fact, it has been noted that deodand is
probably a "misplaced" general principle of English forfeiture law, and in fact such an
analogy was rejected by English courts. See Maxeiner, supra note 2, at 771-72.
22. See Maxeiner, supra note 2, at 776-81. Moreover, both the English practice of
"official seizure and forfeiture" and the British "general warrant," also known as "a writ
of assistance," which was used by the British to search ships and allow for their ultimate
seizure and forfeiture for violations of customs and revenue laws, have been cited as two
of the most significant factors leading to the American Revolution. See United States v.
92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1131-32 (1993) [hereinafter 92 Buena Vista Ave.
II], afftg, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter 92 Buena Vista Ave. 1].
23. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
24. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (prohibiting "[florfeiture except during the life
of the person attainted").
25. This historical development may explain why modem forfeiture statutes still call
for the application of admiralty law procedures to forfeiture actions. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); infra note 112.
26. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 & nn.21-23
(1974).
27. See id at 683.
28. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 13 (1827).
29. See Pratt & Petersen, supra note 12, at 658.
30. See id. at 659. ("[T]he power to declare war involves the power to prosecute it by
all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted. It therefore
includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at
the will of the captor.") (quoting Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305
(1871)).
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rather created their own forfeiture regime.3
B. Modern Civil Forfeiture Statutes
Although less prominent in the century following the Civil War, forfei-
ture subsequently gained renewed acceptance as a powerful weapon in
the modem war on drugs.3 2 The civil forfeiture provisions of the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197033 (the "1970
Drug Control Act") empowered the federal government to seize property
used in connection with illegal substances. Although initially confining
the statute to the narcotics context, Congress has expanded the 1970
Drug Control Act during the last two decades. In 1978, Congress
amended the 1970 Drug Control Act to allow the seizure of proceeds
from illegal drug activity.34 In 1984, Congress further amended the stat-
ute to allow for the forfeiture of all property, including real property
traceable to the illegal activity.35
The enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 further expanded
the scope of civil forfeiture to include the proceeds of money laundering
activity.3 6 The 1990 amendments to that Act increased civil forfeiture's
scope to include proceeds traceable to counterfeiting and other offenses
affecting financial institutions.3 7 In 1992, Congress supplemented these
categories of offenses,3" and further amended the statute to include prop-
erty traceable to motor vehicle theft.3 9
Perhaps the most significant recent development in this area is Con-
gress' enactment of 18 U.S.C. section 984,40 a statute that applies "[in
any forfeiture action in rem in which the subject property is cash, mone-
tary instruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a finan-
cial institution ... or other fungible property."' 4 1 Under section 984, the
31. See Maxeiner, supra note 2, at 771 & n.25.
32. See Pratt & Petersen, supra note 12, at 664.
33. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276-78 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 881).
34. See Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3777 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
35. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
36. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1366(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-35 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
37. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2525(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4874 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
38. See Pub. L. No. 102-393, § 638(d), 106 Stat. 1729, 1788 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)).
39. See Pub. L. No. 102-519, § 104(a), 106 Stat. 3385 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(F) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
40. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1522(a), 106 Stat. 3672, 4063 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 984
(Supp. IV 1992)).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(1) (Supp. IV. 1992); see also United States v. All Funds Pres-
ently On Deposit Or Attempted To Be Deposited In Any Accounts Maintained At
American Express Bank, No. CV-92-5310, 1993 WL 352099, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,
1993) (discussing the enactment and effect of § 984).
[Vol. 62
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government need not "identify the specific property involved in the of-
fense that is the basis for the forfeiture,"42 and may seize "any identical
property found in the same place or account as the property involved in
the offense"'43 which would be subject to forfeiture had it remained in
such place or account. Thus, Congress has not only dramatically in-
creased the number of crimes that support a forfeiture action, but also
has required an ever lessening relationship between the "culpable act"
and the forfeitable property.
As a result of the expansion of civil forfeiture, property subject to
seizure in forfeiture actions is increasingly part of the mainstream econ-
omy rather than contraband. However, no countervailing measures are
being taken to mitigate the harsh effect this can have on innocent third
parties such as creditors. To appreciate this impact, it is necessary to
understand the mechanisms of civil forfeiture. The following sections
discuss five fundamental elements of modern civil forfeiture: (1) the
property subject to forfeiture and the doctrine of "traceable proceeds;"
(2) the "relation back" doctrine; (3) the "innocent owner" defense; (4)
the constitutional limitations on civil forfeiture; and (5) the post-forfei-
ture claims process and the petition for remission.
1. Property Subject to Forfeiture and the Doctrine of "Traceable
Proceeds"
The American statutory forfeiture scheme is broader than the narrow
Biblical "guilty property" doctrine. Both the 1970 Drug Control Act
and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 contain provisions extending the
notion of "guilty property" to include any property or chattel "tracea-
ble" to the crime. 44 Courts have construed these provisions liberally to
include property or funds that have "facilitated" illegal activity.41 Civil
forfeiture law, therefore, has evolved from an approach of punishing
"guilty property" to one of punishing those with a business association
with a guilty individual."
In order to effectuate a forfeiture against particular assets, the govern-
42. 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). It
should be noted that the original 1970 Drug Control Act only allowed for the forfeiture
of either the drugs themselves or the means of their production and distribution. It was
not until the 1978 amendments to the Act that "traceable proceeds" were also included.
See 92 Buena Vista Ave II, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1133 n.16 (1993); see also 18 U.S.C. § 984
(applying forfeiture to money laundering and fungible property).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417,
769 F. Supp. 80, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "[e]ven if a portion of the property
sought to be forfeited is used to 'facilitate' the alleged offense, then all of the property is
forfeitable") (citations omitted); see also United States v. Daccarett, Nos. 1264, 1265, 92-
6229, 92-6259, 1993 WL 347041, at *17 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1993) (holding that property
need only have "nexus" not "substantial connection" to illegal activity to be subject to
forfeiture).
46. See Pratt & Petersen, supra note 12, at 670.
1993]
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ment need not present direct evidence supporting its position that the
forfeited property is traceable to the illegal activity. 7 It only need
demonstrate probable cause that such is the case.48 For example, in
United States v. Parcels of Land,4 9 the government asserted that certain
properties had been purchased with the proceeds of illegal drug activities.
The court allowed the forfeiture of the properties based upon evidence
that the value of the properties greatly exceeded the purchasers' reported
annual income, and that the properties were purchased with large sums
of cash.-"
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Banco
Cafetero Panama5 illustrates the government's attempt to forfeit prop-
erty beyond the direct proceeds of an illegal transaction. In Banco
Cafetero, the government attempted to seize $3 million in five separate
accounts belonging to a depositor, although these funds were not directly
linked to a particular drug transaction. 2 The court permitted forfeiture
not only against the depositor's accounts, but also against the depositee
bank's own account at a second bank, into which the depositee bank
transferred the depositor's forfeitable funds.53 The court concluded that
uncertainties as to the source of the particular funds are to be resolved in
favor of the government. 4 Similarly, in United States v. Certain Funds
on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417,"5 a forfeiture of funds in a money
laundering scheme was upheld where legitimate and illegal funds were
commingled in the bank accounts of various corporations. 6
Adding to the uncertainty and instability caused by the breadth of civil
47. See, e.g., Daccarett, 1993 WL 347041, at *17 ("A finding of probable cause may
be based on hearsay, even hearsay from confidential informants, or circumstantial evi-
dence .... ") (citations omitted); United States v. One 1987 Mercedes 560 SEL, 919 F.2d
327, 331 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Probable cause can be established by circumstantial or hearsay
evidence.").
48. See Daccarett, 1993 WL 347041, at *15-17.
49. 903 F.2d 36, 39-40 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 916 (1990).
50. See id. at 42.
51. 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
52. See id. at 1156, 1158.
53. See id. at 1161.
54. See id. The Second Circuit in Banco Cafetero held that in tracing the proceeds of
illicit activity that are commingled in an account with legitimate funds, the government
can use either of two methods at its option. First, the government can assume that the
account contains the traceable proceeds as long as the account balance remains greater
than the amount of the tainted deposit. Alternatively, the government can assume that
any withdrawal greater than the amount of the tainted deposit contains the traceable
proceeds. See id. at 1159-60. This holding left a loophole because the first method could
be foreclosed by placing the funds into an account in which the balance would fall below
the amount of the tainted deposit. Congress subsequently enacted 18 U.S.C. § 984, which
closed that loophole with respect to money laundering activities covered by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See United States v. All Funds Presently On Deposit Or At-
tempted To Be Deposited In Any Accounts Maintained At American Express Bank, No.
CV-92-5310, 1993 WL 352099, at *14-16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1993).
55. 769 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
56. See id. at 84-85. Although this case did not specifically adopt the analysis used in
Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d 1154, it nevertheless upheld a forfeiture on the grounds that the
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forfeiture laws is the government's stated position that it has absolute
discretion to determine which assets should be subject to forfeiture. For
example, in the recent Supreme Court decision 92 Buena Vista Ave. 11,'
the government asserted that the "traceable proceeds" provision of the
1970 Drug Control Act left to the government the determination as to
which "proceeds" it could seize.5" Under the government's view, if a
house is purchased with drug money and that house is sold to buy an-
other house, the government is allowed to seize both houses or, in order
to mitigate the harshness of a forfeiture in certain circumstances, only
one house at its discretion.59 The Court declined to rule on the merits of
that issue because it was beyond the subject of the grant of certiorari.'
Nonetheless, such unbridled discretion must be addressed in order to
prevent the increasing use of civil forfeiture statutes from undermining
the legitimate expectations of the financial community.
2. "Relation Back" Doctrine
Perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of both the 1970 Drug Control
Act6' and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198662 is the so-called "relation
back" doctrine. Both statutes provide that "[a]ll right, title, and interest
in property... shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture .... ,163 However, the relation back doctrine has
been applied even in the absence of statutory provisions.
For example, in Western Pacific Fisheries, Inc v. SS President Grant,'
the court, in considering a damage claim arising from a collision at sea,
considered the defendant's argument that evidence should have been ad-
mitted to show that the plaintiffs' ship was carrying illegal drugs at the
time of the collision.65 Basing its argument upon the relation back doc-
trine, the defendant maintained that if the drug claim were substantiated,
title to the plaintiffs' ship should have retroactively reverted to the gov-
ernment and, therefore, plaintiffs would not have standing to bring the
present suit. 66 The court, although rejecting defendant's argument be-
cause the government had not yet "consummated" its forfeiture, recog-
nized that had a forfeiture with formal proceedings occurred, "[t]here is
clear authority that . . . the forfeiture relates back to the time of the
funds "facilitated" the illegal activity. See Certain Funds On Deposit, 769 F. Supp. at 84-
85.
57. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
58. See id at 1138.
59. See id
60. See id
61. 21 U.S.C. § 881.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 981.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 981(0 (1988) (emphasis added); 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988) (emphasis
added).
64. 730 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1984).
65. See id at 1286.
66. See id
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violation. '67 Therefore, the broad reach of the relation back doctrine
provides another potential for conflict between the government's ability
to seize a criminal's property and the rights of non-culpable third parties.
3. "Innocent Owner" Defense
Although seemingly at odds with the relation back doctrine, Congress
has statutorily protected certain non-culpable third parties by incorpo-
rating "innocent owner" provisions into the federal forfeiture statutes.
For example, the 1970 Drug Control Act provides that "no property
shall be forfeited ... to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of
any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.",
68
Numerous courts have examined who is an "owner" for purposes of
the "innocent owner" defense.69 For example, courts have held that un-
secured creditors are not "owners" in this context. 70 Secured creditors,
on the other hand, are deemed by statute to be owners.7I
The Supreme Court, in 92 Buena Vista Ave. 11,72 held that the inno-
cent owner provision in the 1970 Drug Control Act is not limited to bona
fide purchasers and may include donees. 73 This holding is premised
upon the unqualified use in the statute of the word "owner" which "fore-
close[s] any contention that it applies only to bona fide purchasers. 74
Thus, the respondent who purchased the forfeited property with illegal
proceeds received as a gift had standing to challenge the forfeiture.75
67. Id. at 1287.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also provides for the
protection of nonculpable third parties, but adds "lienholder" to those protected. See 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Note that neither statute, however, protects
innocent unsecured creditors.
69. See United States v. One 1987 Volkswagen Jetta, 760 F. Supp. 772, 775 (W.D.
Mo. 1991) ("Broadly speaking, ownership may be defined as having a possessory interest
in the res, with its attendant characteristics of dominion and control.") (quoting United
States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, Serial Number 22186, 604 F.2d 27, 28
(8th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($15,500.00), 558 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1977))); see also United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd.,
886 F.2d 618, 625 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The term 'owner' should be broadly interpreted to
include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized.")
(quoting 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522-23). But see United States v. Contents of Ac-
counts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143 at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith,
Inc., 971 F.2d 974, 986-87 (3d Cir. 1992) (adopting "dominion and control" test, but
declining to apply it to a straw owner), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993).
70. See United States v. One 1987 Cadillac Deville, 774 F. Supp. 221, 224 (D. Del.
1991). It is interesting to note that the court in United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp.
820 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1987), in the context of a criminal RICO
statute, held that unsecured trade creditors were considered "bona fide purchasers" for
purposes of an innocent owner defense. See id. at 829.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2).
72. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
73. See id. at 1134-36.
74. Id. at 1134.
75. See id.
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The dissent in 92 Buena Vista Ave. II asserted that a donee who re-
ceives property in a transfer without value has no greater rights in a for-
feiture action than the donor.76 This conclusion is necessary, the dissent
argued, to prevent the cleansing of tainted proceeds by transferring the
proceeds to relatives or other third parties.7 The dissent concluded that
to hold otherwise "rips out the most effective enforcement provisions in
all of the drug forfeiture laws."7"
The level of "innocence" required for an owner to invoke the "inno-
cent owner" defense also is somewhat unclear. The 1970 Drug Control
Act speaks of an owner "without the knowledge or consent ' 79 while the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 omits the words "or consent" and simply
states "without the knowledge."80 The Second Circuit, in United States
v. One Tintoretto Painting,"1 recognized two innocent owner defenses to a
civil forfeiture action that the Supreme Court previously addressed in
dictum in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 2 These two de-
fenses are: (1) the object was stolen or taken without the innocent
owner's consent, and (2) the innocent owner did all that could reasonably
be expected to prevent the proscribed use of the property. 3 A district
court recently held that the innocent owner defenses under the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 lessened the burden imposed by Calero-Toledo
and "requires only a showing of ignorance of the illegal transactions."' "
One issue that the Supreme Court appears to have resolved is whether
the relation back doctrine "trumps" the innocent owner provisions in-
cluded in the federal civil forfeiture statutes. In 92 Buena Vista Ave. I,5
the Third Circuit had held that the "relation back" doctrine did not
trump the "innocent owner" defense.8 6 In Eggleston v. Colorado,"7 the
Tenth Circuit had reached a contrary result, holding that the innocent
76. See i. at 1143-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 1145.
78. Id at 1146.
79. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2).
81. 691 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
83. See One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d at 607 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at
689).
84. United States v. 316 Units of Mun. Secs., 725 F. Supp. 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
However, an owner that remains "wilfully blind" cannot claim the benefits of the inno-
cent owner defense. See United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera, 748 F. Supp. 1180, 1185
(W.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1991).
85. 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
86. See id. at 102 ("[T]he relation back doctrine would only be relevant in this case if
a determination were made that [the innocent owner] did not take out a valid innocent
owner defense."). The Third Circuit relied, in part, on Judge Murnaghan's concurrence
in In re One 1985 Nissan 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1322 (4th Cir. 1989). See 92 Buena
Vista Ave I, 937 F.2d at 102-03. One 1985 Nissan questioned that if the innocent owner
defense were applicable only if the property was obtained prior to the illegal act, then
"[h]ow can one obtain drug deal proceeds before the transaction even takes place?" One
1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d at 1322.
87. 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1070 (1990).
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owner defense is only applicable if the "owner" acquired the property
prior to the commission of the illegal act."8 Therefore, the government's
seizure of property purchased by an innocent buyer after the occurrence
of illicit activity would have been upheld in the Tenth Circuit, but not in
the Third Circuit.
The Supreme Court's decision in 92 Buena Vista Ave. 1189 addressed
this conflict by holding that for the innocent owner provisions to have
meaning they must trump the relation back doctrine.90 The plurality as-
serted that the innocent owner defense would be meaningless if it only
applied to cases where the ownership arose before the illegal activity.9
The concurring opinions reasoned on semantic grounds that the govern-
ment could not forfeit property that it now owned retroactively because
it could not forfeit its own property. 92
4. Constitutional Limitations
Several recent Supreme Court cases have placed constitutional limita-
tions on the government's use of forfeiture. In United States v. Halper,93
the Supreme Court held that civil penalty and forfeiture actions, follow-
ing a criminal conviction, may be severe enough to constitute a second
criminal punishment.94 In Halper, the government instituted a civil ac-
tion against the respondent following his federal conviction for submit-
ting sixty-five false Medicare claims.95 The government sought more
than $130,000 in "remedial penalties" under the False Claims Act,96
even though the respondent defrauded the government of only $585. 9'
The Supreme Court stated that while most civil penalty suits were reme-
dial, these penalties could rise to the level of punishments if the sanctions
were severe enough.9" The Court held that these civil sanctions consti-
tuted punishments when "the civil penalt[ies] ... b[ore] no rational rela-
tion to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss . . .,,"
Consequently, the Court held that the government's second action was
barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause"° because "under the Double
Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a crimi-
nal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to
88. See id. at 248.
89. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
90. See id. at 1137.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1139-41.
93. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
94. See id. at 446-49.
95. See id. at 437. Halper had previously been found guilty of overbilling the govern-
ment for $585. Following his conviction, Halper was sentenced to two years of imprison-
ment and fined $5,000. See id.
96. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
97. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 438-39.
98. See id. at 448-49.
99. Id. at 449.
100. See id. at 452.
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the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as [punitive]." 10'
In Austin v. United States,10 2 the Supreme Court held that civil forfei-
ture actions also implicate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive fines. °3 In Austin, the federal government instituted an in rem
civil forfeiture action, pursuant to the 1970 Drug Control Act, 10 against
the respondent's property following his guilty plea to a state drug posses-
sion charge.'05 The federal government sought the forfeiture of both the
respondent's auto body shop, where the drug sale took place, and the
respondent's home, where the cocaine was stored prior to sale.' 6 Austin
argued that this forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against excessive fines.10 7 Stating that the Eighth Amendment was in-
tended "to limit the government's power to punish,"'0 8 the Court held
that this protection extended to both civil and criminal actions." 9 Rely-
ing on Halper, the Court held that when a civil forfeiture ceases to be
remedial and serves punitive goals, at least in part, then the forfeiture "is
subject to the limitations of the [Eighth Amendment's] Excessive Fines
Clause."110 The Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit to de-
velop factors to consider when determining whether a forfeiture is
"excessive."111
5. Post-Forfeiture Claims Process and the Petition for Remission
Current civil forfeiture law presents a two-tiered approach to resolving
the claims of third parties affected by the forfeiture. First, parties who
are "innocent owners" of seized property may file a proof of claim with
101. Ia at 448-49. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine
what portion of the civil suit was remedial-and allowable-and what portion was puni-
tive and barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 452.
102. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
103. See id at 2812.
104. 21 U.S.C. § 881.
105. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. Austin had previously pled "guilty to one count of




108. Id at 2805.
109. See id at 2806.
110. Id
Ill. See id at 2812. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, advocated a different
Eighth Amendment analysis for in rem forfeitures than for in personam fines. In his
view, the "excessiveness" of an in personam penalty is determined by weighing the "value
of the fine in relation to the offense." Id at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, for in
rem forfeitures, "[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is the relationship of the property to the
offense." Id In short, Justice Scalia's test for determining whether an in rem forfeiture is
excessive under the Eighth Amendment is whether the property is an "instrumentality of
the offense" or whether it is merely tangentially related to the crime. See id. As an
example, Justice Scalia noted that scales used in unlawful drug sales are forfeitable
"whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal." Id.
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the district court.1" 2 In determining the validity of such a claim, the
district court, usually through appointment of a Special Trustee, consid-
ers the proof of claim in light of common law and statutory provisions of
forfeiture.
Second, to the extent the parties seeking redress are not innocent own-
ers of seized property, there is no cognizable legal claim against the
seized assets. Instead, the parties only may seek an equitable remedy
from the DOJ in the form of a petition for remission or mitigation over
which the government has complete discretion.1 13 Therefore, third par-
ties who are not innocent owners are left without recourse if they are
dissatisfied with the DOJ's determination on the petition. While a court
may compel the Attorney General to consider the merits of a petition if it
determines that the Attorney General has ignored the request, 1 4 judicial
review may not be had on the merits.'15 This, however, places almost
unchecked authority in the hands of the DOJ, the same government
agency that stands to benefit monetarily if the petition is denied. These
provisions have generated both controversy and uncertainty.
An example of the difficulty a party faces in contesting the denial of its
petition for remission or mitigation is illustrated by LaChance v. Dng
Enforcement Administration.16 The Drug Enforcement Administration
("the DEA") had seized $49,000 in cash belonging to LaChance, a pro-
fessional harness racer.1 17 LaChance had attempted to carry the funds
on a plane from New York's LaGuardia Airport to Montreal, but was
forced to leave the funds in New York after being informed at a routine
metal detector search of his luggage that such funds could not be taken
abroad. After leaving the funds in the trunk of a borrowed car,
LaChance was approached by DEA agents who wanted to know where
he had left the money. LaChance took the agents to the car, and the
agents gave LaChance a receipt for the funds, now in a brown bag.'" 8
DEA drug-sniffing dogs detected the presence of narcotics either on the
bag or the money. LaChance insisted that the funds were the proceeds
from a horse sale and legal gambling activities and chose to challenge the
forfeiture by a petition for remission rather than in court." 9 The DEA
112. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing that the Sup-
plemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims shall govern the seizure of
assets for forfeiture).
113. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (adopting procedures pro-
vided in customs laws (19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988))); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) (same). The
procedures for filing a petition for remission are set forth in 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-.7 (1992).
114. See, e.g., In re Sixty Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Dollars, 901 F.2d
1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a district court may have jurisdiction "when
the agency does not even consider a request that it exercise its discretion").
115. See United States v. A Parcel of Land in the City of Lucedale, 791 F. Supp. 1144,
1149 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
116. 672 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
117. See id. at 77.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 78.
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denied his petition on the grounds that there was conflicting evidence
concerning his claim that the funds stemmed solely from legal activity.' 2 °
The court declined to review the denial of the petition, holding that a
petition for remission is purely administrative."' The court also held
that an agency's refusal to grant the petition may only be reversed where
the agency refuses to consider the petition or maintains a "formalized
invariable policy of denying petitions and, in fact, fails to give any reason
for denial of the petition in question."'"
II. THE MCNAMARA CASE-AN EXAMPLE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
GONE AWRY
This Part explores the tension between forfeiture law and commercial
and bankruptcy law by examining the effect of the John McNamara for-
feiture123 action on creditors. In 1992, the federal government accused
John McNamara of defrauding General Motors Acceptance Corporation
("GMAC") of more than $400 million.' 24 The ensuing civil forfeiture"z
included a Cessna jet, a car dealership, shopping centers, real estate hold-
ings, a gold mine, and other properties owned by McNamara or arguably
traceable to his allegedly illegal activities.' 26 Excluded from the forfei-
ture were a $500,000 private trust and a $350,000 house owned by
McNamara's estranged wife.' 27
In the years prior to the forfeiture, a significant number of financial
institutions had extended loans to McNamara and his various corporate
entities without any knowledge of or reason to suspect McNamara's ille-
gal activities. Today, following the forfeiture of McNamara's assets,
these financial institutions are confronted with unpaid loans and a debtor
whose assets have been seized by the government.
120. Although the DOJ generally reviews petitions for remission, under certain limited
instances of administrative forfeiture, as in LaChance, the authority is granted to the
DEA. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.77-.81 (1993).
121. See LaChance, 672 F. Supp. at 79.
122. Id. at 80 (citing United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 490 U.S. 980 (1972)).
123. United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16,
1992).
124. See Jane Fritsch, Prosecutors Depict Vast Fraud Scheme By .L Car Dealer, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 16, 1992, at Al.
It should be noted that various estimates of the fraud were reported. Some news re-
ports placed the fraud at $436 million. See iL at B4. Other reports placed the fraud at
$422 million. See John T. McQuiston, Assets of Auto Dealer in Fraud Case to Be Sold,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1992, at B2. GMAC itself, in its claim filed against McNamara,
estimated the amount at $444 million. See Jeanne Dugan Cooper, Lawsuit Links GMAC
to McNamara Fraud, Newsday, Oct. 27, 1992, at 22.
125. See McNamara, No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992).
126. See Fritsch, supra note 124, at Al.
127. See Lueck, supra note 3, at B1.
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A. United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac 12 8
Described by Andrew Maloney, United States Attorney for the East-
ern District of New York, as "the mother of all kiting schemes,' '1 29
McNamara's fraud lasted for over seven years. From January 1985 until
December 1991, McNamara borrowed more than $6 billion from
GMAC allegedly to finance car purchases for his Long Island car dealer-
ship, McNamara Buick-Pontiac. Under the scheme, McNamara in-
formed GMAC that the borrowed funds would be used to purchase
refurbished cars and vans from an Indiana corporation, Kay Industries.
These cars and vans, in turn, would be shipped to Cydonia Trading Ltd.
in Cyprus. In reality, both entities were "shell companies" linked to
McNamara. The loans were used to finance McNamara's personal hold-
ings including real estate, a gold mine, and other personal assets. McNa-
mara never missed a loan payment, and would simply borrow from
GMAC to pay off existing loans. It was not until 1991 that GMAC's
auditors became suspicious of McNamara's claim that he needed $2.1
billion to purchase 70,000 vehicles. Further inquiry revealed that the
vehicle identification numbers did not appear in automotive trade jour-
nals. Subsequent investigation confirmed the GMAC auditors' suspi-
cions that the vehicles were indeed shams, created on paper to perpetuate
the McNamara loan-kiting scheme. 130
In addition to the forfeiture action, McNamara was indicted on one
RICO count and six federal wire fraud counts.13 1 In the aggregate, these
charges carried a maximum sentence of 20 years and more than $800
million in fines.'13  McNamara, who originally pleaded not guilty, was
released on a bond of $300 million, most of which was forfeited prop-
erty. 133 He eventually pleaded guilty to the racketeering charge in a plea
bargain agreement with the government. 134
The government maintained that the civil forfeiture action would en-
able McNamara to devote his remaining resources to defending the crim-
inal charges, 135 by freezing the claims of GMAC and nearly 6,000 other
creditors, 136 including the numerous financial institutions that had se-
cured and/or unsecured claims against the McNamara entities. 137 The
128. No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992).
129. Fritsch, supra note 124, at B4. "Kiting" is a slang term that refers to a debtor's
continuing practice of borrowing money from one source to repay another source of debt.
See id.
130. For an overview of the fraud, see id.
131. See Jacques Steinberg, Auto Dealer is Indicted for Fraud, N.Y. Times, May 27,
1992, at B4.
132. See id.
133. See Steven Lee Myers, L.I. Dealer Pleads Not Guilty to G.M. Loan Fraud Charges,
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1992, at B5.
134. See Fredrick M. Winship, UPI, Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
135. See Lueck, supra note 3, at BI.
136. See McQuiston, supra note 124.
137. One of the major problems for McNamara's creditors is that the forfeiture order
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government contended that "[i]t is not the policy of the Government to
take over properties from innocent parties."' 38 The government's inten-
tion was to use civil forfeiture in "a novel, imaginative and just way to
insure that the public is protected."' 39 In actuality, however, the govern-
ment has used forfeiture law to supplant bankruptcy law by liquidating
the McNamara estate and resolving claims of creditors. As this Article
shows, forfeiture law never was intended for that broad purpose.
B. Civil Forfeiture's Usurpation of Commercial and Bankruptcy Law
Principles
In order to understand how civil forfeiture actions affect creditors, it is
first necessary to understand the process by which creditors, such as fi-
nancial institutions, extend credit. In making lending decisions and in
determining interest rates and other lending terms, financial institutions
consider factors such as the borrower's financial condition, management,
and the likelihood of both default and potential recovery of principal and
interest on defaulted loans. In assessing the default risk, financial institu-
tions also consider their rights and remedies under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code and the likelihood of recoveries.
Notably absent from this "checklist" is the risk of civil forfeiture of the
borrower's assets. It is, of course, impossible at the time of the credit
decision to estimate the likelihood of civil forfeiture because the underly-
ing illicit action that may give rise to the forfeiture is as yet undiscovered,
and also because the bringing of such an action is politically determined.
Furthermore, even if the financial institution were to assume the worst-
that each borrower's assets would be subject to civil forfeiture-it is im-
possible to estimate how claims will be paid, if at all.
Note that even small scale forfeitures can affect creditors. For exam-
ple, a local grocer may extend credit to a neighborhood resident who
turns out to be a drug dealer. If the government seizes not only the con-
traband, but all of the resident's assets, the grocer is left unpaid. One
may question whether there is a difference, other than of scale, between
forfeiture in this situation and forfeiture in the McNamara case. None-
theless, the government's interest in seizing the assets of the drug dealer,
whose victim is really society at large, perhaps may be said to outweigh
the occasional and incidental injustice.""4 On the other hand, when the
imposes a stay on all pending actions (including foreclosure proceedings) and requires
that state court-appointed receivers turn over all proceeds from the forfeited assets to the
Special Trustee appointed in the federal forfeiture action. See United States v. McNa-
mara Buick Pontiac, No. CV-92-2070 4-5 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992). See infra note
204 for further discussion of the implications of federal stay of state court proceedings.
138. Jane Fritsch, U.S. to Seek Forfeiture, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1992, at B4.
139. Martin Fox, $400 Million Civil Forfeiture Ordered in Long Island Auto Loan Pros-
ecution, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1992, at 1, 5.
140. The government would also argue that the grocer could file a petition for remis-
sion. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the grocer is an innocent
trade creditor of the drug dealer, and therefore would have been entitled, under non-
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assets seized are a significant part of the mainstream economy, and par-
ticularly when the illicit activity is fraud directed toward private parties,
the balance more obviously shifts so that the interests of creditors out-
weigh the government's incidental interest in seizing the assets.
The concerns in either case at least could be mitigated if the seizure
were only of those assets directly used in the illicit activity. The conflict
with innocent third parties therefore results, to some extent, from the
zealousness of prosecutors in seizing traceable proceeds14 in addition to
assets used in the illicit activity.
This conflict is exemplified by six problems that are raised by the appli-
cation of civil forfeiture in the commercial context: (1) the lack of a well-
defined statutory procedure; (2) the failure to recognize unsecured
claims; (3) the failure to respect separate corporate entities; (4) the un-
dermining of the Bankruptcy Code policy of discouraging setoffs; (5) the
obstruction of state law remedies; and (6) the problems caused by the
preemption of bankruptcy avoiding powers.
1. Forfeiture Lacks a Well-Defined Statutory Procedure
In a civil forfeiture action, an unsecured creditor has virtually no pro-
cedural mechanisms through which to become informed and contest
matters affecting its interests. Because civil forfeiture is a remedy that
derives from antiquated admiralty seizures, 142 the creditor lacks the well-
established procedures necessary for application in a complex and mod-
em commercial world. In addition, current civil forfeiture law does not
present a forum where creditors or their representatives are encouraged
to participate or be heard. 43
In comparison, under federal bankruptcy law, all creditors are notified
and invited to attend an initial meeting of creditors and, in the case of
reorganization proceedings, to participate in subsequent periodic hear-
ings."' Committees of creditors, and where appropriate committees of
holders of equity securities, are required or permitted by law to be ap-
pointed to represent the parties in interest generally and to participate in
the case. 14 5 Debtor company actions that are outside the ordinary course
forfeiture law, to assert a claim as of right against the drug dealer's assets. The forfeiture
takes away this right.
141. See supra part I.B.1.
142. See supra note 25.
143. Although the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
provide for limited notice and hearing requirements, both the procedural and substantive
provisions regulating bankruptcy court proceedings appear to be lacking in forfeiture law.
See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988); 28 U.S.C.A. Supp. Rules for Certain Admiralty and Mari-
time Claims, B(2), C(4).
144. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 342, 1109(b) (1988).
145. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 705, 1102 (1988). Committees of creditors are required under
federal bankruptcy law in chapter 11 reorganizations and permitted at the request of
creditors in chapter 7 liquidations. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 705(a)
(1988). Although a forfeiture action could be in the nature of either a reorganization or a
liquidation, the McNamara forfeiture is in the nature of a liquidation. In a chapter 7
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of business require court authorization after notice is given to creditors
and other interested parties, and after a hearing is held at which a bank-
ruptcy judge can consider all parties' views.' Furthermore, in the reor-
ganization of a debtor company, the final resolution of claims and
interests normally is negotiated as part of a consensual plan, and is ap-
proved through a voting procedure that is carefully balanced to protect
the rights of all parties.'4 7 In short, the Bankruptcy Code is designed to
allow a debtor either to reorganize its affairs or to liquidate, while simul-
taneously allowing creditors to participate in events that could materially
affect the debtor or the debtor's obligations.
In a civil forfeiture, on the other hand, there is no meaningful proce-
dure for creditors. Creditors are notified, at best, intermittently. 48 In
addition, individual creditors rarely have an economic stake large enough
to actively participate in the forfeiture proceeding. Therefore, they are
effectively disenfranchised and are unable to formally participate in the
proceeding or to be represented by a committee of representative credi-
tors. 149 Indeed, even for creditors having a large stake, there is no forum
in which issues and concerns are discussed on a current basis.
2. Forfeiture Fails to Give Formal Recognition to Unsecured Claims
Civil forfeiture does not recognize unsecured creditors as having
claims as of right. 5 ' Except to the extent that a creditor may have a
liquidation, a trustee is appointed to "collect and reduce to money the property of the
estate... as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest."
11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1988). The committee of creditors is authorized to consult with the
trustee or court appointed administrative officers in connection with the administration of
the estate, make recommendations respecting performance of the trustee's duties, and
submit to the court or its administrative officers questions affecting the administration of
the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 705.
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988). Certain administrative and procedural issues
are heard before a trustee who is part of the court system, as opposed to a judge. See 11
U.S.C. Part X-1001 to X-1010 (1988).
147. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123-1129 (1988). For an introduction to bankruptcy, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Basics of Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy, 68 J. Com. Bank
Lending 36 (1985), revised and updated in A Special Collection From the J. Com. Bank
Lending: Bankruptcy 79 (1988).
148. Title 18 of the United States Code, section 981, has no ongoing notice
requirements.
149. It is conceivable that creditors in a forfeiture action could join forces, but no
provision for such committees exists in law or in practice. In fact, the discretionary na-
ture of forfeitures may discourage the formation of such committees, as parties may wish
to gain favor with the government on an individual basis. Furthermore, such committees
would have no legal foundation or norms upon which to premise any plan for distribu-
tion, and individual creditors would be unsure of whether the plan would give them bet-
ter status than a court.
150. The failure of civil forfeiture law to recognize unsecured claims as of right may
well result from the fact that, until recently, only specific assets were seized by the gov-
ernment. Where, on the other hand, the government seizes all of a company's assets, all
parties with "interests" in the company are affected-whether those interests stem from
ownership, collateral, or merely an unsecured claim. Unsecured claims can arise, for
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security interest in collateral,'' the creditor does not have a legally rec-
ognized claim. Creditors, to the extent of their unsecured claims, there-
fore are unable to avail themselves of the "innocent owner" defense,' 52
and are limited to filing petitions for remission, subject to the DOJ's
whim. 153
The Attorney General's discretion and a line of forfeiture cases hold-
ing that the government's decision as to how to allocate forfeited assets
to creditors, if at all, is not subject to judicial review on the merits, 154
create a "chilling effect" on creditors. Why, for example, should a credi-
tor attempt to challenge a government action in a forfeiture case if the
creditor has no leverage over the government and the possible result of
the challenge is to antagonize the same government officials who will
have absolute discretion in deciding how or whether to reimburse the
creditor's claim?
Furthermore, because there is no requirement that creditors who are
similarly situated be equally reimbursed from the forfeited assets, the
possibility exists that these creditors will be treated inconsistently. This
is contrary to bankruptcy law, which generally requires parity of treat-
ment for creditors having similar claims. 55
Similarly, in bankruptcy, the claims of unsecured creditors are supe-
rior to any governmental claims for "forfeiture ... or punitive damages
... to the extent that such [a] ... forfeiture [is] not compensation for [an]
actual pecuniary loss .... ,"156 While civil forfeitures are usually reme-
dial in nature, 57 the Supreme Court has held that where a "civil penalty
... bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Govern-
ment for its loss" it is punitive.'
example, from loans made to the company or for payment of the purchase price of goods
or services rendered to the company.
151. Title 18, section 981(a)(2), of the United States Code by its own terms recognizes
a "lien" on collateral of an innocent creditor. Even that may be subject to negotiation. A
valuation of collateral is subjective, and a low valuation can result in the creditor being
unsecured to the extent the amount of the claim exceeds the collateral valuation. Fur-
thermore, secured creditors, even though the Supreme Court in 92 Buena Vista Ave. H
explicitly rejected the government's relation back argument, must still establish the "in-
nocent owner" defense prior to being granted their legal claim. See 92 Buena Vista Ave.
11, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (1993).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2); United States v. One 1987 Cadillac Deville, 774 F.
Supp. 221, 224 (D. Del. 1991).
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)-(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Compare § 726 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code which creates an unambiguous ordering of priorities of claims and §§ 501
and 502 of the Bankruptcy Code which give legal recognition to unsecured claims. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502, 726 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
154. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988).
157. See, e.g., United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that the government's seizure of appellant's seventeen acre marijuana farm was
remedial); United States v. 30 Ironwood Ct., 776 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (N.D. Il1. 1991)
(holding that forfeiture of plaintiff's property for a drug offense was remedial).
158. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989); see supra part I.B.4.
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In McNamara, the government sought the forfeiture of over $400 mil-
lion of property. McNamara's kiting scheme-although injuring private
third party creditors-was not a theft of government money. Conse-
quently, the government's "losses," at most, consisted of its "costs" of
investigating and legally pursuing McNamara.' 59 Coincidentally, the
salaries of all the United States Attorneys and their Assistants in 1989
totalled only $434 million." ° Unless the federal government's entire
legal staff surrendered all their other responsibilities in order to pursue
McNamara, the $400 million forfeiture appears to go well beyond
remediation and bears "no rational relation" ' ' to the government's loss.
Consequently, under the Bankruptcy Code, the government's forfeiture
claims against McNamara-as punitive claims- would be subordinate
to the claims of unsecured creditors.1
62
It also should be noted that courts' construction of the forfeiture laws
as not recognizing unsecured claims as of right makes for poor public
policy in the commercial context. For example, in United States v. One
1987 Cadillac DeVille,163 the government and an innocent third party
claimant disputed the priority of their respective interests in an automo-
bile, the purchase of which constituted "money laundering" of illegal
drug profits. 6" The claimant asserted that he had loaned his cousin the
money to buy the vehicle, and that the car was collateral for the loan.
The claimant, however, failed to perfect his security interest in the auto-
mobile under state law.' 65 Accordingly, the court ruled that "[a]gainst
the Government, the claimant stands in the position of an unsecured
159. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 445. The injury to the government also "include[s]...
[the] ancillary costs, such as the costs of detection and investigation, that routinely attend
the government's efforts ... ." Id; see also United States v. 38 Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d
29, 37 (2d Cir.) (holding that compensation includes not only remedying the govern-
ment's direct pecuniary loss but also its investigatory, overhead, and other costs attribu-
table to the matter), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
160. See Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government:
Fiscal Year 1991, at A-224 (1990).
161. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988). These facts also raise an issue of whether forfeitures
such as the McNamara forfeiture constitute "excessive" fines under the Eighth Amend-
ment. In Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), the majority emphasized that
while the Court has used the "guilty property" fiction to justify forfeiture actions in the
past, there was always an element of "culpability" present in these actions. See id. at
2809. The Court interpreted Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) as holding "that forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's property [which arguably
should include a claim of an innocent unsecured creditor] would raise 'serious constitu-
tional questions.'" Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-
90).
In addition, by focusing solely on the acts of the culpable debtor, Justice Scalia's ap-
proach in Austin of limiting forfeiture to the "instrumentality of the offense" would limit
application of the traceable proceeds doctrine and preserve more assets for the benefit of
unsecured creditors. See iL at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. 774 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1991).
164. See id at 222.




In addition to noting that an unsecured creditor lacks standing to chal-
lenge a federal forfeiture action, 167 the court stated that the government,
in a federal forfeiture action, effectively has the status of a lien creditor
under Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") section 9-301(3).168 Con-
sequently, under U.C.C. section 9-301(1)(b), the claimant's unperfected
security interest was subordinate to the government's "lien creditor"
interest. 169
Although 1987 Cadillac DeVille pertained to an informal family lend-
ing arrangement, the court's rationale as to why an unsecured creditor's
claim should be subordinate to the government's interest in seized prop-
erty is revealing. The court concluded that "[i]f the claimant does indeed
have a valid agreement with his cousin, the owner of the car, for repay-
ment of a loan, he may seek redress from her." 170 This logic presup-
poses, however, that the cousin had assets remaining against which the
claimant could attempt to recover.
Where, however, the government by using the relation back and trace-
able proceeds doctrines is able to seize all assets of a corporate borrower,
there may be no assets remaining from which creditors can be repaid.
The logical flaw in the 1987 Cadillac DeVille court's analysis is that it
assumes there are assets-other than those seized by the government-
against which an innocent unsecured creditor can seek to be repaid.' 7'
Forfeiture law also creates an anomaly in that a donee who does not
give value may be protected under the innocent owner provisions. In
contrast, the only recourse of an unsecured creditor who does give value
is to file a discretionary petition for remission.171 In 92 Buena Vista Ave.
11,173 the Supreme Court held that bona fide purchasers who acquire
property after the "culpable act" of the prior owner are permitted to
retain the property free of any governmental forfeiture claims relating
back to the culpable act. 74 Similar results are reached under commer-
cial law, which allows bona fide purchasers who give value to acquire
166. See id. at 224.
167. See id. (citing United States v. One 1965 Cessna 320C Twin Engine Airplane, 715




171. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right of a
bona fide purchaser to defeat the government's claim to a seized asset. If the bona fide
purchaser were subordinate to the government's claim, the purchaser would have inno-
cently paid value and, in effect, received nothing in return. But this is the same situation
as that of an innocent creditor who, after advancing money or goods to a company, ceases
to have a debtor responsible for repayment because the government seized all of the
debtor's assets.
172. See supra note 113.
173. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
174. See id. at 1134-37.
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goods free of pre-existing security interests.1 75
92 Buena Vista Ave II went further, however, by extending the inno-
cent owner defense to the recipients of gifts even though existing case law
fails to extend the defense to unsecured creditors. 76 This creates the
inequity that donees who have not given value are protected, while un-
secured creditors who have given value are not. This is particularly
troublesome because commercial law traditionally disfavors not-for-
value exchanges but protects for-value exchanges. 177 The solution would
be to extend the innocent owner defense to unsecured creditors who give
value.
3. Forfeiture Does Not Respect Separate Corporate Identities
"[T]he real purpose [behind] much [of] commercial law"' 78 is the busi-
ness world's reliance on reasonable contractual expectations. Preserving
reasonable expectations also has been recognized as essential in both
bankruptcy cases and cases involving interpretation of contracts. For ex-
ample, in In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 17 the Second Circuit refused
to substantively consolidate' 80 two separate but related bankruptcy debt-
175. See U.C.C. § 9-307. For example, U.C.C. § 9-307(l) provides that a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" (a person who buys out of the seller's "inventory") takes free
of pre-existing perfected security interests in those goods. Section 1-201(9) of the U.C.C.
defines a "buyer in ordinary course of business" as one who "buys" by giving cash, prop-
erty, or other forms of new value. Similarly, § 9-307(2) protects casual buyers of con-
sumer goods (the "garage sale" purchaser) from pre-existing security interests. Most
casual purchasers take free of pre-existing perfected security interests in these goods if,
inter alia, the casual bona fide purchasers gives new value. Moreover, § 2-403(1) of the
U.C.C. also protects bona fide purchasers of goods from a seller with voidable title. This
section allows, in certain circumstances, the seller to convey better title than he actually
owns to a buyer who gives value. For example, if A entrusts his watch to jeweler B for
repairs, and B sells A's watch in the ordinary course of business to C for value, then C
acquires title to A's watch. See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commer-
cial Code, § 3-11 (3d ed. 1988).
176. See 92 Buena Vista Ave. I, 113 S. Ct. at 1134.
177. The U.C.C. generally allows bona fide purchasers who "give value" to acquire
goods free of a third party's perfected security interest, or even a third party's bona fide
claim to title in the goods. See supra note 175. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code also
favors "for value" transactions over gift conveyances or "unequal exchanges." See II
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988) (allowing the trustee in certain circumstances to set aside
conveyances if the debtor's estate did not receive "reasonably equivalent value" in
return).
178. G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Com-
mercial Cases An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1198, 1203 (1988); see
also U.C.C. § 1-205 (emphasizing the importance of course of dealing and the usage of
trade); U.C.C. § 2-609 (discussing the right to adequate assurance of performance in
commercial transactions).
179. 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
180. In certain instances, a bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers under § 105
of the Bankruptcy Code to substantively consolidate two or more affiliated corporations.
See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). This means that the court will order that the assets and
liabilities of separate corporations be treated as if such corporations were merged. In
determining whether to substantively consolidate the estates of multiple debtors, bank-
ruptcy courts look to a number of factors, including:
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ors' estates, a process which would have combined the debtors' assets to
form a single pool from which all creditors would share ratably. Had the
court allowed substantive consolidation in Augie/Restivo, the lender to
the more solvent of the two debtors would have received less of a recov-
ery from the pooled assets than it would have obtained by looking exclu-
sively to the assets of its more solvent debtor. The court held that
allowing substantive consolidation would run counter to the lenders' ex-
pectations that "are central to the calculation of interest rates and other
types of loans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore important to
the efficiency of credit markets."''
Civil forfeiture law, as presently codified, can wreak havoc upon the
reasonable expectations of creditors.18 2 This premise is best understood
within the context of the McNamara Buick-Pontiac forfeiture by consid-
ering a fictitious but representative creditor, "Island Bank." Assume
that some years before the McNamara fraud became public knowledge,
Island Bank, without knowledge of the fraud, loaned $5 million to
McNamara Realty Corp. ("Realty"), 183 a corporation whose shares are
owned entirely by John McNamara. Island Bank's loan is secured by a
mortgage on property of Realty that was worth $6 million at the time of
the loan but, because of a declining real estate market, is presently worth
only $3 million. In addition, Realty currently has $4 million of unen-
cumbered real estate and $500,000 on deposit in an account at Island
[W]hether creditors knowingly deal with corporations as [a] unit.., whether
one debtor was independent of other debtor when certain securities issued;
whether creditor dealt only with one debtor and lacked knowledge of its rela-
tionships with others; whether interrelationships of group were closely entan-
gled.., whether entanglement of business affairs of related corporations was so
extensive that the cost of untangling would outweigh any benefit to creditors...
presence or absence of consolidated financial statements; difficulty in segregat-
ing individual debtors' assets and liabilities; existence of parent and inter-corpo-
rate guarantees on loans; unity of interest and ownership; existence of transfers
of assets without observance of corporate formalities; profitability of consolida-
tion at single physical location ....
Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518 (citations omitted).
Furthermore, because substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy, a court is un-
likely to order it if the result would injure a class of innocent creditors. See id. at 518-19.
For a general discussion of substantive consolidation, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured
Finance: A Guide To The Principles Of Asset Securitization (2d ed. 1993).
181. Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 519. Similarly, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court emphasized the need
for predictability by refusing to read into an indenture an implied covenant to prevent a
leveraged buyout. See id. at 1508.
182. There is also the view that creditors' expectations will change to take forfeiture
law into account. The fallacy of that view, however, is that the use of civil forfeiture,
being both infrequent and random, can never reasonably be anticipated by an innocent
creditor. This should be distinguished from the situation where a new law, or a change in
the law, itself reshapes the expectations of parties who may be affected by the law.
183. Although McNamara Realty Corp. is not a real company, the factual scenario
described above is both typical and representative of the McNamara case and of large
civil business frauds generally.
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Bank. Realty therefore is a solvent company, in that its assets exceed its
liabilities.
Assume further that a fictitious company, XYZ Credit Corp.
("XYZ"), is a primary victim of the fraud. XYZ loaned $100 million to
automobile dealerships owned by John McNamara, but did not lend any
money to Realty. The automobile dealerships are now insolvent.
The rights and remedies of Island Bank may be significantly different if
civil forfeiture law is applied instead of commercial and bankruptcy
law."84 The policy question raised, again, is whether in a commercial
context conflicting bodies of law should be allowed to govern the same
subject matter, especially when, from the standpoint of innocent third
parties, the determination of which body of law applies to a given situa-
tion is random.
In a bankruptcy case involving multiple corporations," 5 the separate
corporate structure of each company is generally respected. Creditors of
a given corporation are reasonably assured that their right to be repaid
from that corporation's assets will have priority over the rights, if any, of
creditors of another, affiliated corporation. Although a bankruptcy court
may pool the assets and liabilities of separate corporations under the eq-
uitable doctrine of substantive consolidation, decisions such as Augiel
Restivo 6 indicate that such power is judiciously invoked.I 7 Typically
such consolidations occur only after a finding that normal corporate for-
malities were not respected and, only then, where innocent creditors
would not be significantly impaired by that result.t8 8
In a civil forfeiture, by contrast, there is no assurance that separate
corporate identities will be respected. For example, John McNamara ran
his business through multiple corporations, the stock of which he owned
184. Whether, in a particular instance, the civil forfeiture law rights and remedies will
require a different result than under commercial/bankruptcy law is immaterial. The sali-
ent point for purposes of this Article is that it may be different, thus creating uncertain
expectations between the parties, and removing the measure of certainty required for the
meaningful transaction of business (eg., loan agreements). Furthermore, a creditor
whose claim is secured by collateral valued in excess of the amount of the claim may be
better off in a forfeiture than in a bankruptcy case, because forfeiture law specifically
recognizes secured claims of innocent creditors. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2). In addition,
the creditor would not be subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy, or to the risk of
replacement of the collateral for adequate protection. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(a), 363,
364 (1988). Nonetheless, forfeiture law may give sufficiently broad power to the govern-
ment to impose restrictions if it wishes to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
185. Modem business often is conducted through affiliated corporations, sometimes
under common control of one person or corporation. In the case against John McNa-
mara, United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, Inc., No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July
16, 1992), McNamara owned stock of dozens of separate corporations through which he
ran his business empire.
186. 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
187. See id. at 519-20.
188. See id. at 518; supra note 180.
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directly or indirectly through subsidiaries. 89 The government asserted
that all of the unencumbered assets of these corporations were derived
from traceable proceeds of the fraud,19 ° and therefore belong to the gov-
ernment. In effect, through the application of federal forfeiture law, the
government, like a bankruptcy court, substantively consolidated the
McNamara empire. The government entertains the unsecured creditors'
petitions for relief from this large asset pool. To the extent that the gov-
ernment, through these petitions, allocates assets to the unsecured credi-
tors, some creditors will benefit while others suffer. Unfortunately, none
of the criteria used to guide bankruptcy courts are considered in forfei-
ture actions. The traceability of proceeds, not the separate corporate
identities or the rights of innocent creditors,19 is the only touchstone of
analysis.
As an example, consider Island Bank's $5 million loan to Realty, a
solvent corporation. In a bankruptcy of Realty, Island Bank would ex-
pect to recover the entire amount of its loan.' 92 XYZ, on the other hand,
will not recover its full loan because its borrowers' (the automobile deal-
erships) liabilities exceed their assets. But in a civil forfeiture, if the gov-
ernment pooled the unencumbered assets of Realty and affiliated
corporations for the benefit of all the unsecured creditors, both Island
Bank, based on the $2 million unsecured portion of its loan,' 93 and XYZ,
based on its $100 million loan, would have a remission claim against the
combined assets of Realty and the automobile dealerships. If the value of
the resultant combined unsecured asset pool is less than the amount of
the combined unsecured claims of creditors of Realty and the automobile
dealerships, then each creditor holding an unsecured claim would (as-
suming that the creditor's petition for remission was granted) receive less
than the full amount of its remission claim. In effect, XYZ would benefit
unfairly from the pooling of Realty's assets, while Island Bank would
suffer unjustly from XYZ's claim.
It is ironic that the creditors hurt the most by a consolidation are those
who made loans to the most financially sound of the corporate entities
and unexpectedly find themselves sharing their borrowers' assets with
creditors of riskier enterprises. The least conservative lenders, on the
189. See United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, Inc., No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y.
July 16, 1992).
190. The Second Circuit in United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154
(2d Cir. 1986), liberally construed forfeiture's "traceable proceeds" provision to allow
forfeiture of five separate bank accounts where uncertainty as to the legality of the source
of the funds existed. See id. at 1159-60; supra note 54. Under recently enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 984, Congress has even further expanded forfeiture's reach in cases involving money
laundering.
191. See supra part I.B.1.
192. However, Island Bank will likely suffer a delay in collection because of the auto-
matic stay in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
193. Recall that Island Bank's $5 million loan is secured by collateral presently worth
only $3 million, leaving a $2 million unsecured deficiency. Its loan therefore is under-
secured by $2 million.
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other hand, who were able to charge higher interest rates on their loans
to the less credit-worthy borrowers benefit from the consolidation by
sharing in the combined asset pool. It is questionable, at best, whether
forfeiture law should impose this fundamental unfairness.
4. Forfeiture Undermines Bankruptcy Code Policy Discouraging
Setoffs
The Bankruptcy Code by its terms gives creditors a secured claim with
respect to certain deposit accounts in order to discourage creditors from
setting off funds in those accounts, and thereby prematurely forcing a
company into liquidation.1 94 To the extent a bank has a borrower's
funds on deposit in an account, such funds in the event of a bankruptcy
would become cash collateral for pre-bankruptcy loans made by the bank
to the borrower to the extent the bank could have set off such funds prior
to bankruptcy.' 95 In this way, the Bankruptcy Code harmonizes the in-
terests of the debtor and its estate while protecting the rights of creditors.
Therefore, in the case of Island Bank, the $500,000 in Realty's deposit
account with Island Bank would become cash collateral for Island
Bank's loan to Realty in the event Realty files for bankruptcy. In plan-
ning its workout strategy, Island Bank would be encouraged by the poli-
cies underlying the Bankruptcy Code not to set off the account, and
might be penalized if it did set off the account.' 96
Unlike the Bankruptcy Code, civil forfeiture provides no apparent pro-
tection for a party having the right to set off funds in the wrongdoer's
deposit account. Furthermore, under the common law, only mutually
owing debts can be set off. Therefore, prior to a forfeiture, Island Bank
would be entitled to offset (L e., retain) the $500,000 deposit balance it
"owes" to Realty against the outstanding loan Realty owes to Island
Bank. However, a forfeiture could prevent the setoff because the relation
back provisions' 97 provide that all of Realty's assets, including the
$500,000 deposit account funds, vest retroactively in the United States to
the time of the criminal act.'98 Because Island Bank would then "owe"
the $500,000 to the United States and not to Realty, the mutuality of
indebtedness may be destroyed and Island Bank's common law setoff
rights may be lost.
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988). Indeed, 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
further discourages premature setoffs by providing that all or a portion of amounts set off
may have to be returned under certain circumstances specified therein.
195. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
197. Under the Supreme Court's decision in 92 Buena Vista Are. 11, 113 S. Ct. 1126
(1993), Island Bank could still try to assert an "innocent owner" defense and a court
would have to rule on the merits of the claim prior to the application of the "relation
back" doctrine. See iL at 1134-37. Although the court held that donees would qualify as
"innocent owners," it did not address the issue (because it was not presented) of whether
a bank holding an account subject to set off would possess the requisite "ownership"
under the "innocent owner" defense. See id. at 1134-35.
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(0; 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).
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Under this scenario, Island Bank reasonably would want to exercise its
setoff rights at the earliest possible moment for fear that a civil forfeiture
action might be commenced. Once Island Bank sets off, it becomes the
owner of the funds in the deposit account, and therefore trumps the gov-
ernment's interest in the funds.'9 9 Realty, for its part, would suffer the
loss of the forbearance Island Bank might otherwise extend if its rights
were not impaired by a forfeiture. The result would be to precipitate
Realty's slide into bankruptcy at a time when Realty might have been
able to avoid a bankruptcy.
5. Forfeiture May Thwart State Law Remedies
Assume that prior to forfeiture Realty defaulted on its loan obligations
and Island Bank moved for and obtained the appointment of a receiver
for the properties mortgaged to Island Bank. A state court receiver's
duties typically include the collection of rents, payment of the properties'
operating expenses, and escrow or payment to the mortgagee of any sur-
plus funds to be applied against the mortgage debt. 200 The appointment
of a receiver protects Island Bank's interest in Realty's rents as well as
the interests of other creditors by preventing Realty's principals from
using the company's assets for improper purposes or personal benefit.
If Realty subsequently files for bankruptcy, the receiver may, at the
discretion of the court, continue to perform its duties or be ordered to
turn over the property to the bankruptcy trustee who would operate Re-
alty's estate for the benefit of all creditors.20 In either event, Realty's
rents would likely become Island Bank's cash collateral.20 2
In a civil forfeiture, the forfeiture order may call for the removal of a
state court-appointed receiver for the mortgaged properties.20 3 The fed-
eral court-appointed Special Trustee, responsible for controlling and
overseeing all of the forfeited property, would replace the state court re-
ceiver. 2" While contracts or existing statutes define the duties and obli-
gations of a state court receiver, statutes do not prescribe the role that a
199. See supra part I.B.3. This assumes that Island Bank is an innocent owner of the
funds set off.
200. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 6401(b) (McKinney 1980) (setting forth powers
of temporary receiver).
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 543 (1988).
202. See In re Financial Ctr. Assocs., 140 B.R. 829, 834-35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Island Bank's use of the cash collateral would be limited by § 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
203. See, e.g., United States v. McNamara Pontiac-Buick, Inc., No. CV-92-2070
(E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992) (ordering a decree of forfeiture and appointing a special
trustee).
204. Such an order may raise a question under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1988), which prohibits federal courts from interfering with certain orders issued
by a state court. In National Cancer Hospital of America v. Webster, 251 F.2d 466 (2d
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 824 (1959), the Court held that a federal court could not
enjoin a state court receiver who had been directed by a state court to distribute seized
monies to certain cancer institutions. See id. at 467-68.
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Special Trustee will serve in a forfeiture action. Lenders and other credi-
tors have no means to predict how, when, or if a borrower's assets might
be seized and, once seized, how the Special Trustee will distribute those
assets to creditors.
6. Forfeiture May Prevent Creditor Recovery of Preferences and
Fraudulent Conveyances by Preempting a Bankruptcy Filing
Under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code,2"5 transfers of cash or
other property made by a company to creditors within 90 days2 of the
company's bankruptcy may, under certain circumstances, have to be re-
turned as preferential. Furthermore, under section 548 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code,2 "7 transfers made (or obligations incurred) within one year
of the company's bankruptcy may have to be returned as fraudulent con-
veyances if the company did not receive "reasonably equivalent value" in
return.208 The congressional intent behind sections 547 and 548 was to
ensure an equal and fair distribution of a debtor's estate.t 9
A civil forfeiture, however, may preempt these important Bankruptcy
Code provisions. The government asserts that forfeiture gives it title to
and control of all the assets of a wrongdoer. Therefore, because after
forfeiture wrongdoers no longer own the stock of corporations previously
controlled by them, they may not be able to cause bankruptcy petitions
to be filed for those corporations.2 10 Involuntary bankruptcy petitions
also would be stayed by the forfeiture.
The 90-day period for federal preference actions and the one-year pe-
riod for federal fraudulent conveyance actions21 are therefore likely to
pass without creditors being able to challenge the transfer as preferential
or fraudulent. Furthermore, forfeiture law, being federal law, would ap-
pear to preempt any applicable state fraudulent conveyance law.
2 12
205. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
206. If the creditor is an "insider," the 90-day period becomes one year. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
207. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
208. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). For a discussion of fraudulent conveyance law and
its application, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Fraudulent Conveyance Law on
Future Advances Supported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 Cardozo L.
Rev. 729 (1987); Steven L. Schwarcz & Gabe Shawn Varges, Guaranties and Other
Third-Party Credit Supports, Commercial Loan Documentation Guide 16-1 (1989).
209. See, e.g., In re Antweil, 931 F.2d 689, 692 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The most important
purpose of section 547(b) [of the Bankruptcy Code] is to facilitate equal distribution of
the debtor's assets among the creditors.") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 1385 (1992);
In re Weisman, 112 B.R. 138, 140 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) ("The fundamental purpose of
the § 548 fraudulent conveyance statute was to protect creditors from transfers of assets
of the debtor.").
210. The issue of whether forfeiture preempts bankruptcy nonetheless appears to be
without legal precedent.
211. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4), 548(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).




Consider, for example, that in the final days of the McNamara empire,
prior to the revelation of the fraud, McNamara decided to transfer prop-
erty and/or funds to a large creditor, family, or friends in an attempt to
place such assets beyond the reach of forfeiture. Existing civil forfeiture
law provides no procedure for creditors to challenge such transfers, plac-
ing creditors at the mercy of the government's decision whether or not to
institute such a challenge.213 More importantly, to the extent the trans-
ferees are unaware of the fraud, the innocent owner provisions of forfei-
ture law 214 would protect the transfers, including those made to donees,
even if the result of the transfers was to deplete significantly the assets
left for repayment of innocent creditors. This is in direct contrast to the
bankruptcy preference and fraudulent conveyance laws.215 These laws
operate to bring assets transferred in advance of bankruptcy back to the
debtor's estate to the extent the debtor was insolvent and did not receive
the requisite measure of value in return for the transfer.
III. A RECENT MODEL FOR BALANCING GOVERNMENTAL AND
COMMERCIAL LAW INTERESTS
In reevaluating civil forfeiture law, Congress should compare the pres-
ent situation with the perceived conflict of interest previously faced by
another arm of government, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898,216 the predecessor statute to the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, included a broad role for the
SEC in bankruptcy proceedings. 217  The SEC had the right to be
"deemed a party in interest" and to be heard on all matters arising in a
bankruptcy proceeding. The SEC served as an advisor and final expert
for the court, weighing protection of the "public interest" against the




This is analogous to the DOJ's role in forfeiture actions-weighing the
"public interest" in combating illegal activity against the claims of inno-
cent creditors and other parties to commercial transactions.
Equally striking in the analogy between the SEC's role in bankruptcy
and the DOJ's role in forfeiture is the government's conflicting roles in
each. In re Yuba Consolidated Industries219 illustrates this conflict. The
213. It is a curious phenomenon that the government, at times, will at its discretion
exempt certain property from forfeiture. For example in United States v. McNamara
Buick-Pontiac, Inc., No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992), the government excluded
a private trust and McNamara's estranged wife's house from the Forfeiture Order.
214. See supra part I.B.3.
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 547; 11 U.S.C. § 548.
216. 30 Stat. 544 (1898). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is the predecessor statute to the
Bankruptcy Code.
217. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 208 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a)
(1988)).
218. See William Miller Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 1109.01 (15th ed. 1993).
219. 260 F. Supp. 930 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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court strongly admonished the SEC for its opposition to a fee application
by an attorney for a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding. 2 In harsh
language, the court reprimanded the SEC for its "attitude calculated to
discourage and stifle individual creditors from actively participating in
chapter X proceedings-particularly where a creditor aggressively op-
poses the views of the SEC."22'
In the 1978 revision of the bankruptcy laws, Congress re-evaluated the
SEC's dual role as both advocate and advisor in bankruptcy proceedings.
Section 1109 of the Bankruptcy Code significantly alters the role of the
SEC in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding by providing that, although
it may be heard on any issue, it may not appeal from any order entered in
the bankruptcy case. 2" Legislative history explicitly reveals congres-
sional intent that the SEC "not [be] a party in interest. ' 12 3 The SEC
therefore no longer has a statutory right to file a plan of reorganization
for the debtor's business; that right is reserved for a "party in inter-
est." '2 24 The SEC apparently has accepted this more restricted role, and
has suggested that it will limit its participation in bankruptcy cases to
ensuring that disclosure requirements are met. In addition, the SEC will
intervene if a court so requests or if a particular case will set legal prece-
dent. 25 The bankruptcy context thus provides a recent historical prece-
dent where a conflict between protecting the "public interest" and the
commercial interests of third parties led to restrictions on governmental
power in order to achieve a more reasonable balance.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Civil forfeiture law likewise should be reformed to arrive at a more
reasonable balance between ensuring that wrongdoers do not retain the
profits of their illicit activity and preserving the legitimate expectations of
parties to commercial transactions. Although this balance can be
achieved in various ways, there is one approach to reform that is both
simple and effective. Forfeiture laws should be amended so that when
applied to assets not directly used in the illicit activity, only the wrong-
doer's equity in those assets is seized. In other words, the government's
interest should be limited to the residual portion, if any, that remains
after innocent creditors have exhausted their rights, remedies, claims,
and interests under applicable commercial and bankruptcy laws. The
government would have, in effect, only a contingent springing interest in
220. See idi at 960-63.
221. Id. at 962.
222. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
223. See 124 Cong. Rec. S17,419 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks by Sen. Dennis
DeConcini) cited in Collier, supra note 218, at 1109-17.
224. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988).
225. See Collier, supra note 218, at 1109-14 n.32a (quoting Daniel L. Goelzer, General
Counsel of the SEC).
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the wrongdoer's assets that are traceable to, but not used directly in, the
wrongdoer's illicit activities.
This approach allows the government to uphold legitimate commercial
expectations while preventing the wrongdoer from retaining profits from
illicit activity. It also addresses the concerns previously raised by this
Article. Because the government does not preempt the claims-paying
process, the procedural protections of commercial and bankruptcy law
will be applicable. Unsecured claims will be recognized and paid as of
right. Separate corporate identities will be respected. In addition, credi-
tors will have exhausted their non-forfeiture rights and remedies before
the government's forfeiture rights mature.226
Until the forfeiture laws are changed to implement this reform, gov-
ernment forfeiture actions intended to protect the "public interest" inad-
vertently could deny property rights to innocent creditors. The
government therefore should consider adopting interim reforms of its
own. First, the government should adopt the claims-paying priorities
from bankruptcy law to prevent unfairness to creditors. Furthermore,
unsecured claims of innocent creditors should be paid as of right from
seized assets. In addition, forfeiture law should respect separate corpo-
rate identities unless there is a reason to "pierce the corporate veil."227
As the law currently exists, the government can gather together property
seized from affiliated corporate entities whose only connection with the
wrongful conduct is that the property consists of traceable proceeds.
Although the natural inclination of prosecutors may be to distribute the
seized property to victims of wrongful conduct, the present law simply
creates more innocent victims by depriving creditors of their bargained
for recovery.
Finally, when innocent parties may be affected, the government should
use its discretion to seize, at least at the outset, only property directly
used in the wrongdoing. This not only would bring civil forfeiture closer
to its historical roots but also would mitigate the disruption of commer-
cial transactions by restricting the property subject to forfeiture.
Creditors also should be given procedural rights under forfeiture law.
Creditors are presently confronted by an ad hoc system, devoid of any
meaningful process, in which the government retains virtually complete
discretion as to the distribution of seized assets. If the government gave
creditors the right to be heard after notice, and appointed a representa-
226. Alternatively, the same result could be achieved by amending forfeiture law to
allow the government to seize the wrongdoer's traceable assets at the outset, but subordi-
nating the government's interest in the seized assets not directly used in the illicit activity
to the rights, remedies, claims and interests of innocent third parties. Such a provision
would be enforceable in a bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1988). The gov-
ernment therefore could not take any action against the "seized" assets until innocent
creditors exhausted their rights and remedies under non-forfeiture law.
227. See, e.g., In re Sims, 994 F.2d 210, 217-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing when to




tive group of creditors to advise the government in administering and
distributing seized property, it would go far to alleviate the frustration
now felt by unsecured and undersecured creditors.
This Article suggests that unsecured claims of innocent creditors
should be paid as of right. Under existing forfeiture law, the mechanism
for payment is the petition for remission. The petition for remission is in
need of reform, however, not only because it gives the government discre-
tion whether to pay a claim but also because the government's determi-
nation is not subject to judicial review on the merits." 8 Under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), by way of contrast, agency ac-
tion is generally subject to judicial review." 9 Normally, the standard of
review applied to agency determinations permits the reviewing court to
overrule the agency determination when it is "arbitrary, capricious [or]
an abuse of discretion. 23
0
Moreover, the failure to provide judicial review of DOJ determinations
is exacerbated by the conflict of interest under which the DOJ operates.
The DOJ, which is the agency that entertains petitions for relief, may
stand to benefit directly if such petitions are denied.
Therefore, the petition for remission should be replaced by a proof of
claim procedure, perhaps similar to that provided under sections 501
through 502 of the Bankruptcy Code and the related bankruptcy rules."
To the extent that the petition for remission has any ongoing viability, its
function should be limited primarily to the determination of the inno-
cence of creditors who file a claim. In making that determination, the
government should be subject to the normal standard of judicial review
of agency action, as described above.
CONCLUSION
The state of modem civil forfeiture law reveals a statutory and legal
web of doctrine that has removed forfeiture not only from its historical
origins but also from the realities of modem commercial dealings. By
denying fair treatment of creditors, the application of civil forfeiture stat-
utes threatens to undermine the principles of commercial reasonableness
and predictability that underlie commercial transactions. Financial insti-
228. At one time, district courts were empowered to remit or mitigate forfeitures. See.
e-g., Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, 27 U.S.C. § 40a (repealed 1948), cited in
United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 220-21 (1939).
229. See 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1988).
230. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). Although the APA does have a "carve out" for
instances of "agency action ...committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2), courts have established a three-part test for determining whether an agency
action fits within this exception. Factors to be evaluated include appropriateness of the
issues raised for judicial supervision to safeguard the interests of plaintiffs and the impact
of review on the effectiveness of the agency carrying out its responsibilities. See Hahn v.
Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970).
231. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-502 (1988); 11 U.S.C. Rul. 3001-3022 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
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tutions and other creditors are subject to forfeiture laws that were never
intended to apply to them, and that lead to results substantively different
than would be reached under bankruptcy and commercial law. Civil for-
feiture historically has served, and still retains, a legitimate role in soci-
ety's efforts to ensure that crime does not pay. That goal, however,
should not be achieved-and indeed need not be achieved-at the ex-
pense of innocent third parties.
